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LOCAL HIRE LAWS: ALASKA'S FUTILE
ATTEMPTS AT PREFERENTIAL TREATMENT
I. INTRODUCTION
Laws granting state residents1 preferential treatment in public
construction employment are a recurring legislative event in Alaska.2
The popularity of such laws stems in large part from the unique condi-
tion of Alaska's labor market. Alaska has one of the highest unem-
ployment rates and most seasonal economies in the United States.3
Moreover, the state's job market is unusually dependent upon the con-
struction industry.4 In addition, nonresidents as a group do not return
their wages to the Alaska economy to the same extent as residents.5
Many nonresidents viewed Alaska as an attractive source of em-
ployment when the Trans-Alaska Pipeline and accompanying reve-
nues spurred the growth of the state's economy. 6 The increased
demand for labor in Alaska, combined with the then existing national
recession, brought an influx of nonresidents to the state.7 Although no
proof existed that the nonresident workers threatened the employment
prospects of Alaskans," the legislature nevertheless enacted employ-
ment preference acts, popularly known as local hire laws, to prevent
Copyright © 1987 by Alaska Law Review
1. An Alaska "resident" is one who is "physically present ... with the intent to
remain . . . indefinitely and to make a home in the state." ALASKA STAT.
§ 01.10.055(a) (Supp. 1987).
2. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. §§ 36.10.005-.990 (Supp. 1986); id. § 36.10.010 (re-
pealed 1986); id. § 38.40.030 (repealed 1980).
3. ALASKA DEP'T OF LABOR, NONRESIDENTS WORKING IN ALASKA (1987)
[hereinafter LABOR REPORT]. In 1985 Alaska had the fifth highest overall unemploy-
ment rate in the United States. Id. at 15.
4. Id. Construction provided 8% of Alaska's jobs in 1985, but in the United
States as a whole, construction provided only 4.7% of jobs. Id. at 19.
5. Id. In 1985, 58% of all residents worked during all four calendar quarters,
whereas only 11% of nonresidents worked during all four quarters. Id. at 20. Be-
cause nonresidents work fewer quarters in Alaska and receive a much higher portion
of their unemployment benefits while residing in other states, see infra note 13, it is
reasonable to assume that the nonresident spends more time outside Alaska and con-
sequently spends more of his salary outside Alaska than the resident, thus giving less
benefit to Alaska's economy, especially since Alaska has no state income tax. Id. at
41.
6. ALASKA DEP'T OF LABOR, NONRESIDENTS WORKING IN ALASKA 41 (1986).
7. Id.
8. Id.
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nonresidents from "tak[ing] jobs which otherwise would to [sic] to
Alaskan residents." 9
Despite decreasing oil revenue10 and high unemployment, 1
Alaska still has a large percentage of nonresident workers. In 1985,
twelve percent of all wages paid in Alaska were paid to nonresidents,
who accounted for twenty-three percent of the Alaska work force.12
Furthermore, in 1985, Alaska led the nation in the percentage of state
unemployment compensation payments sent to employees out of
state. 13 Seventy-four percent of the out-of-state payments went to
nonresidents. 14 Consequently, Alaska legislators have not lost their
fervor for local hire laws.
Alaska has made three attempts to establish a policy of preferen-
tial hire for its residents. The first statute to reach the courts was
enacted in 1972, immediately before construction began on the Trans-
Alaska Pipeline.' 5 The statute, ("Alaska Hire"), provided an employ-
ment preference for Alaska residents to work on oil and gas projects
resulting from leases with the state. 16 The United States Supreme
Court subsequently declared this statute unconstitutional in Hicklin v.
Orbeck 17 Another statute, which predated Alaska Hire but was liti-
gated after the Hicklin decision, required that ninety-five percent of
the entire workforce on state-funded construction projects be Alaska
residents, if such residents were qualified and available.' 8 Finding
Hicklin controlling, the Alaska Supreme Court declared this statute
unconstitutional in Robison v. Francis. 19 Finally, in 1986, the Alaska
Legislature adopted a local hire law more narrowly tailored than those
9. See Robison v. Francis, 713 P.2d 259, 265 (Alaska 1986).
10. For example, the State of Alaska General Fund's unrestricted revenues, of
which 80% is oil revenue, has decreased from $3.1 billion in 1986 to a projected $1.7
billion in 1987. Telephone interview with Bob Elliott, Research Analyst, Department
of Revenues (Sept. 14, 1987).
11. Alaska's overall unemployment rate rose from 9.6% in 1985 to 10.9% in
1986. Telephone interview with John Boucher, Economist, Alaska Department of
Labor (Sept. 14, 1987).
12. LABOR REPORT, supra note 3, at 20.
13. Id. at 41. Almost 22% of all regular unemployment insurance benefits paid
by Alaska in 1985 were interstate payments. The national average was 4.8%. Id.
14. Id.
15. Boucher, Resident and Nonresident Employment in Alaska, 5 ALASKA ECO-
NOMIC TRENDS 1 (1985).
16. ALASKA STAT. § 38.40.030 (repealed 1980).
17. 437 U.S. 518 (1978).
18. ALASKA STAT. § 36.10.010 (repealed 1986).
19. 713 P.2d 259 (Alaska 1986).
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found unconstitutional in Hicklin and Francis.2 0 The new statute al-
lows preferential treatment for certain residents of "zones of underem-
ployment" and "economically distressed zones" within Alaska.21 This
statute has not yet been tested before the Alaska Supreme Court.
This note focuses on the constitutionality of local hire laws, a
controversial issue both inside and outside Alaska. The note first ana-
lyzes United States Supreme Court rulings on resident preference
laws. Next it examines positions that other state courts have adopted
regarding the constitutionality of laws favoring resident workers. The
third part scrutinizes the local hire laws enacted by the Alaska Legis-
lature and examines how these laws have been treated by Alaska
courts. Finally, this note evaluates the constitutionality of Alaska's
most recent resident preference law, and concludes that this law, like
its predecessors, violates the privileges and immunities clause of article
IV of the United States Constitution and may violate the equal protec-
tion clause of Alaska's Constitution.
II. DECISIONS OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT
The United States Supreme Court has entertained many chal-
lenges to the constitutionality of local hire laws. 22 Challengers have
attacked local hire laws under the equal protection clause, the com-
merce clause, and the privileges and immunities clause of article IV.23
20. ALASKA STAT. §§ 36.10.005-.990 (1987).
21. Id.
22. See, e.g., United Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. Mayor of Camden, 465
U.S. 208 (1984); White v. Massachusetts Council of Constr. Employers, 460 U.S. 204
(1983); Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437 U.S. 518 (1978).
23. The plaintiffs in Robison v. Francis, 713 P.2d 259 (Alaska 1986), also chal-
lenged the local hire law under the fourteenth amendment privileges and immunities
clause, which prohibits states from creating laws that would abridge "the privileges
and immunities of the citizens of the United States." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
This clause, however, is an unlikely route for such a challenge. In the Slaughterhouse
Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873), the Court held that the privileges and immunities
clause of the fourteenth amendment protects only such rights as are inherent in federal
citizenship. Later cases have severely limited these rights, which include petitioning
Congress, voting in federal elections, and traveling interstate. See Twining v. New
Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908); L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 7-4, at
423 (1978). Professor Tribe warns that one should "treat the clause as alive and tech-
nically robust." Id. at 426. However, the Court has only found one state to have
violated the clause, a decision which it overruled within a few years. See 2 R. Ro-
TUNDA, J. NOWAK, & J. YOUNG, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 14.3, at 8
(1986) (citing Colgate v. Harvey, 296 U.S. 404 (1935), overruled in Madden v. Ken-
tucky, 309 U.S. 83 (1940)).
In this note, discussion of the privileges and immunities clause refers to the arti-
cle IV privileges and immunities clause unless otherwise stated.
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Currently, only the privileges and immunities clause of article IV pro-
vides litigants with a sound basis to argue for the invalidation of a
local hire statute.24
24. The Supreme Court has severely limited the applicability of the equal protec-
tion clause to local hire laws. The equal protection clause is concerned with govern-
ment classifications that distinguish between persons who should be regarded as
similarly situated. Alaska Pacific Assurance Co. v. Brown, 687 P.2d 264, 271 (Alaska
1984); L. TRIBE, supra note 23, § 16-1, at 993. The United States Supreme Court has
developed a two-tiered analysis to determine whether a classification violates the equal
protection clause. If a classification impinges a fundamental right or is based on a
suspect class, the court applies strict scrutiny. Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v.
Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 312 n.3 (1976) (giving examples of fundamental rights as in-
cluding those of a uniquely private nature and the rights to vote, travel interstate, and
procreate); San Antonio School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973) (defining sus-
pect class as one "saddled with such disabilities, or subjected to such a history of
purposeful unequal treatment, or relegated to such a position of political powerless-
ness as to command extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political pro-
cess"). Under the strict scrutiny test, the classification must be necessary to promote a
compelling state interest. Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 432-33 (1984). If strict
scrutiny does not apply, the Court applies a rational relation test: The classification
need only be rationally related to a legitimate government purpose. Schweiker v. Wil-
son, 450 U.S. 221, 230 (1981) (citing Matthews v. DeCastro, 429 U.S. 181 (1976);
Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970)).
The latter analysis, the rational basis test, applies to local hire law cases. In Mas-
sachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976), the Court held that no
fundamental right to government employment exists. Id. at 313. Cf McCarthy v.
Philadelphia Civil Serv. Comm'n, 424 U.S. 645 (1976) (per curiam) (rejecting equal
protection challenge to municipal residency requirement for municipal workers); see
also Hicklin v. Orbeck, 565 P.2d 159 (Alaska 1977). Nonresidents are not a suspect
class. Martinez v. Bynum, 461 U.S. 321, 328 n.7 (1983). Because no fundamental
right or suspect class is involved in the equal protection analysis of a local hire law,
the law would be analyzed under the lenient rational basis test, which a state may
easily meet. See Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 464 (198 1);
L. TRIBE, supra note 23, § 16-2, at 996 (noting that some courts have equated the
rational basis test with a "strong presumption of constitutionality").
The commerce clause also provides no remedy to those who suffer discrimination
under resident preference laws. In White v. Massachusetts Council of Construction
Employers, 460 U.S. 204 (1983), the Court flatly rejected a commerce clause challenge
to a local hire law promulgated through an executive order by the mayor of Boston.
Because the Court resolved the case under the commerce clause, it did not address
whether the local hire law violated the privileges and immunities clause. Id. at 214-15
n.12. Although the local hire law at issue discriminated against nonresidents, the city,
in hiring for its own construction projects, was a "market participant," not a "market
regulator." Id. at 214-15. The Court first articulated this distinction in Hughes v.
Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794 (1976), stating: "Nothing in the purposes ani-
mating the Commerce Clause prohibits a state, in the absence of congressional action,
from participating in the market and exercising the right to favor its own citizens over
others." Id. at 810 (footnotes omitted). As a market participant, the city could dis-
criminate without violating the commerce clause. The city enjoyed "'the long recog-
nized right of trader or manufacturer, engaged in an entirely private business, freely to
exercise his own independent discretion as to parties with whom he will deal.'" Id. at
438-39 (quoting United States v. Colgate Co., 250 U.S. 300, 307 (1919)). The Court
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In the cases considered thus far, the Court has provided a rela-
tively straightforward framework for privileges and immunities analy-
sis of local hire laws. Before presenting that framework, this note
discusses the origins and purposes of the privileges and immunities
clause.
A. Privileges and Immunities Analysis: Background
and Framework
The privileges and immunities clause originated in the fourth arti-
cle of the Articles of Confederation.2 5 The present clause was "formed
exactly upon the principles" enunciated by the Articles Congress.2 6
The drafters intended to combat protectionist economic policies
emerging among the states after the American Revolution2 7 and to
"fuse into one Nation a collection of independent, sovereign states."'2 8
The privileges and immunities clause thus provides that "[t]he Citi-
zens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of
Citizens in several States." 29
In recognition of the drafters' intent, the United States Supreme
Court has limited the scope of the clause to those privileges and immu-
nities "bearing upon the vitality of the Nation as a single entity," 30
calling these "fundamental rights."''a Because the clause was designed
to create a "national economic union, '32 the Court considers employ-
ment a fundamental right for the purposes of privileges and immuni-
ties analysis. As early as 1871, the Court recognized "the right of a
citizen of one State to pass into any other State of the Union for the
affirmed this view in United Building & Construction Trades Council v. Mayor of
Camden, holding that Camden's local hire law did not violate the commerce clause.
465 U.S. at 204, 220 (1984).
25. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION, art. IV.
26. 3 M. FARRAND, RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENrION OF 1787 112
(1911), quoted in New Hampshire v. Piper, 470 U.S. 274, 279-80 n.7 (1985).
27. Salla v. County of Monroe, 48 N.Y.2d 514, 520-21, 399 N.E.2d 909, 912, 423
N.Y.S.2d 878, 880-81 (1979).
28. New Hampshire v. Piper, 470 U.S. 274, 279 (1985) (quoting Toomer v. Wit-
sell, 334 U.S. 385, 395 (1948)).
29. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1. Two points of terminology are noteworthy.
First, under privileges and immunities analysis, the terms "citizen" and "resident" are
"essentially interchangeable." Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437 U.S. 518, 524 n.8 (1978) (cita-
tions omitted). Second, the term "citizen," as used in the privileges and immunities
clause, includes neither corporations nor aliens. Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.)
168 (1869).
30. Baldwin v. Montana Fish & Game Comm'n, 436 U.S. 371, 383 (1978).
31. Id. at 384 n.20. Note that fundamental rights in the privileges and immunities
context are not equivalent to fundamental rights under equal protection analysis:
Only those rights fundamental to national unity will trigger privileges and immunities
protection. L. TRIBE, supra note 23, at 35 (Supp. 1979).
32. Piper, 470 U.S. at 279-80.
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purpose of engaging in lawful commerce, trade, or business without
molestation... . ,33 Thus, one seeking employment outside his home
state may claim the protection of the privileges and immunities clause.
In United Building & Construction Trades Council v. Mayor of Cam-
den, even more pertinently, the Court held that private employment
on public works projects is a fundamental right. 34
Even when a fundamental right is involved, however, the privi-
leges and immunities clause does not afford a nonresident worker ab-
solute protection. In Toomer v. Witsell,35 the United States Supreme
Court held that the Constitution prohibits only certain types of dis-
crimination against nonresidents. The Court in Toomer articulated a
fairly rigid test under which a state could constitutionally justify dis-
criminating against nonresidents. First, the state must prove that a
"substantial reason" exists for the discrimination. 36 To fulfill this re-
quirement, the state must show that nonresidents constitute "a pecu-
liar source of the evil" that the discrimination is designed to combat.37
Second, the state must narrowly tailor a statute so that in the opinion
of the Court a "reasonable relationship" exists "between the danger
represented by non-citizens, as a class, and the severe discrimination
practiced upon them."'38
In summary, the United States Supreme Court's framework re-
quires that a fundamental right, such as employment, be involved
before a litigant can invoke the protection afforded by the privileges
and immunities clause. Even when a fundamental right is involved,
however, the state can defeat the claim by sustaining the burden of
showing that it has a substantial justification for its discrimination
against nonresidents and that the law in question is narrowly tailored
to combat the problem for which it was created.
B. Hicklin and Camden
The United States Supreme Court has considered privileges and
immunities clause challenges to local hire laws in Hicklin v. Orbeck39
and United Building & Construction Trades Council v. Mayor of Cam-
den.4° In Hicklin, the resident preference law in question required
that "all oil and gas leases, easements or right of way permits for oil
and gas pipeline purposes, unitization agreements or any renegotiation
33. Ward v. Maryland, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 418, 430 (1871).
34. 465 U.S. 208, 221 (1984).
35. 334 U.S. 385 (1948).
36. Id. at 396.
37. Id. at 398.
38. Id. at 399.
39. 437 U.S. 518 (1978).
40. 465 U.S. 208 (1984).
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of any of the preceding to which the state is a party" contain a provi-
sion "requiring the employment of qualified Alaska residents" as pre-
ferred to nonresidents. 41  Eight nonresidents42  who sought
employment in Alaska challenged the act under both the privileges
and immunities clause and the equal protection clause.4 3
The Alaska Supreme Court, though striking the law's durational
residency requirement, 44 upheld as constitutional the distinction be-
tween residents and nonresidents.45 With little elaboration, the court
ruled that the local hire law satisfied state and federal equal protection
clauses.46 Relying on an old line of cases holding that a state can pre-
fer its own residents when distributing its natural resources, the court
also concluded that the Alaska Hire law did not fall within the pur-
view of the privileges and immunities clause.47
The United States Supreme Court reversed the Alaska Supreme
Court and struck down the Alaska statute in its entirety as violative of
the privileges and immunities clause.48 The Supreme Court noted that
employment constitutes a fundamental right and therefore deserves
protection under the privileges and immunities clause.49 Even if the
state's justification for Alaska Hire were valid, an assumption charac-
terized as "dubious," the Court opined that the statute could not pass
41. ALASKA STAT. § 38.40.030 (repealed 1980). This statute provided:
In order to create, protect and preserve the right of Alaska residents to em-
ployment, the commissioner of natural resources shall incorporate
into all oil and gas leases, easements or right-of-way permits for oil or gas
pipeline purposes, unitization agreements or any renegotiation of any of the
preceding to which the state is a party, provisions requiring the lessee to
comply with applicable laws and regulations with regard to the employment
of Alaska residents, a provision requiring the employment of qualified
Alaska residents, a provision prohibiting discrimination against Alaska resi-
dents ....
Id.
42. The preference originally included a one-year durational residency require-
ment, but that portion of the act was stricken as a violation of the equal protection
clause by the Alaska Supreme Court in Hicklin v. Orbeck, 565 P.2d 159 (Alaska
1977).
43. Because the United States Supreme Court found the statute to violate the
privileges and immunities clause, it did not consider the equal protection clause chal-
lenge. Hicklin, 437 U.S. at 534.
44. See supra note 42.
45. Hicklin, 565 P.2d at 167, 169.
46. Id. at 167.
47. Id. at 169. This line of cases begins with Corfield v. Coryell, 6 Fed. Cas. 546
(C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823), in which a court upheld a law limiting commercial shellfishing to
local fishermen. The court held that the fishery was the common property of the
residents of New Jersey and could be restricted for their use. Id. See also Geer v.
Connecticut, 161 U.S. 513 (1896); McCready v. Virginia, 94 U.S. 391 (1877).
48. Hicklin, 437 U.S. at 534.
49. Id. at 525.
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either part of the Toomer test. 50 First, the state failed to present a
substantial justification for its discrimination. Alaska had not shown
that nonresidents were a "peculiar source" of the state's high unem-
ployment. In fact, many Alaska residents were jobless because they
were not qualified for available employment.5 1 Second, the state had
failed to prove that the act was sufficiently narrow in scope.5 2 The act,
which granted an across-the-board preference for all jobs and all resi-
dents, regardless of training or employment status, was grossly
overinclusive.5 3
The Court also refuted the state's claim of immunity from the
strictures of the privileges and immunities clause based on the natural
resources exception. 54 The Court noted that a state's proprietary con-
nection to the discrimination may warrant consideration, but held that
Alaska's attenuated proprietary interest in the contracts regulated by
Alaska Hire could not justify the resulting discrimination.5 5 Accord-
ing to the Court, the Act "[was] an attempt to force virtually all busi-
nesses that benefit in some way from the economic ripple effect of
Alaska's decision to develop its oil and gas resources to bias their em-
ployment practices in favor of the state's residents. '5 6
The Court next applied privileges and immunities analysis to a
local hire law in United Building & Construction Trades Council v.
Mayor of Camden. 57 Camden involved a municipal law that required
forty percent of all employees of contractors and subcontractors on
city projects to be Camden residents.5 8 The proposed justification
presented by the city was that the law was enacted to alleviate eco-
nomic blight and to halt the resulting exodus of Camden's residents.5 9
Although the case applies a privileges and immunities analysis to
a municipal law,60 the Court's opinion is applicable to state laws in
50. Id. at 526-27 (footnote omitted).
51. Id.
52. Id. at 527-28.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 528.
55. Id. at 529.
56. Id. The Court noted that the only limit on the scope of Alaska Hire was that
the activity to which the statute was applied take place within Alaska. Id. at 531.
57. 465 U.S. 208 (1984).
58. The Camden ordinance, adopted as part of a statewide affirmative action pro-
gram, required that contractors on public works projects attempt to employ Camden
residents and always have Camden residents comprising at least 40% of workers. Id,
at 211.
59. Id. at 222.
60. Id. at 216-18. The Court held that the Camden ordinance was not exempt
from privileges and immunities clause review at the challenge of out-of-state residents
merely because some in-state residents were similarly affected by the ordinance. Id. at
217-18.
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several respects. The Court held the right to employment with private
contractors on public works projects to be fundamental. 61 The Court
also outlined the appropriate framework for evaluating the constitu-
tionality of the statute, the Toomer test refined in Hicklin ("the
Toomer-Hicklin test"). 62 However, due to a sparsity of evidence, the
Court declined to apply the test.63 Instead, the Court remanded the
case for evaluation under the articulated standards."4
Camden shows that the Court is retreating from the hard line it
took against local hire laws in Hicklin. The Court made several nota-
ble points that could work in favor of a state attempting to defend a
local hire law. First, the Court held that any analysis under the privi-
leges and immunities clause must "be conducted with due regard for
the principle that states should have considerable leeway in analyzing
local evils and in prescribing appropriate cures."' 65 Second, noting
Camden's proprietary interest in the jobs at issue, the Court stated
that granting leeway was especially important when a government
practiced discrimination as a condition of its own spending.6 6 The
Court distinguished its rejection of the proprietary interest asserted in
Hicklin,67 which it had held to be too attenuated to justify Alaska's
discrimination. The Camden ordinance, by contrast, did not have the
"ripple effect" that proved fatal to the Alaska law.68 "It [the Camden
ordinance] is limited in scope to employees working directly on city
public works projects," the Court noted.69 As the preceding discus-
sion shows, the Camden Court apparently recognized the importance
of the mitigating factors it had rejected under the Hicklin facts. Un-
fortunately, due to the lack of evidence before the Court, it could not
apply these factors to the local hire law in controversy.70
61. Id. at 219.
62. See supra notes 50-53 and accompanying text.
63. Camden, 465 U.S. at 223. No trial had been held in the case. The Supreme
Court of New Jersey had certified the case for direct appeal after brief administrative
proceedings pertaining to the state treasurer's approval of the law. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 222-23 (quoting Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 396 (1948)).
66. Id. at 223.
67. See supra notes 59-60 and accompanying text.
68. United Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. Mayor of Camden, 465 U.S. 208,
223 (1984).
69. Id.
70. One group of commentators interprets the Camden ruling as clearly favorable
to states attempting to uphold local hire laws. See 1 R. ROTUNDA, J. NOWAK, & J.
YOUNG, supra note 23, § 12-7, at 658. The authors state that Camden's reference to
other cases upholding restrictions on public employment against equal protection and
commerce clause claims indicates that the Court is unlikely to invalidate city or state
residency requirements for public employment under the privileges and immunities
clause. Id.
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III. STATE COURT INTERPRETATIONS OF LOCAL HIRE LAWS
A. State v. Antonich: Wyoming Preference Act Upheld
Wyoming is the only state in which a highest state court has held
a local hire law constitutional in the wake of Camden. The case that
tested the Wyoming law, State v. Antonich,71 stemmed from the crimi-
nal prosecution of construction company superintendent Roger
Antonich.72 The state charged Antonich with violating the Wyoming
Preference Act,73 which gives a complete preference to qualified Wyo-
ming residents for employment on public works projects and provides
misdemeanor penalties for supervisors who flout the law.74 The prose-
cutor alleged that Antonich fired a Wyoming worker from a public
construction project in order to hire nonresident workers.75 The
county court dismissed the charge on the ground that the statute vio-
lated the privileges and immunities clause. The Wyoming Supreme
Court reversed and found that the statute satisfied the Toomer-Hicklin
test.76
As a threshold matter, the state conceded that the Wyoming Pref-
erence Act burdened a fundamental right, the right of a nonresident to
work on a public construction project,77 and therefore fell within the
purview of the privileges and immunities clause. The evil that the Act
was intended to combat was ".... a resident remaining unemployed
while a nonresident takes a job on a Wyoming public works project."'78
The court found that "without question" reduction in unemployment
is a valid state goal. 79 Conceding that other states' local hire laws
have usually not survived privileges and immunities scrutiny, the
court explained several factors distinguishing the Wyoming statute
71. 694 P.2d 60 (Wyo. 1985).
72. Id. at 61.
73. Wyo. STAT. §§ 16-6-201 to -206 (1977). The Act provides:
Every person who is charged with the duty of construction, reconstructing,
improving, enlarging, altering or repairing any public works project or im-
provement for the state or any political subdivision ... shall employ only
Wyoming laborers on the project or improvement. Every contract let by any
person shall contain a provision requiring that Wyoming labor be used ex-
cept other laborers may be used when Wyoming laborers are not available
for the employment from within the state or are not qualified to perform the
work involved.
Id. § 16-6-203 (1977).
74. Id. § 16-6-206 (1977).
75. Antonich, 694 P.2d at 61.
76. Id. at 64.
77. Id. at 62.
78. Id. (citation omitted).
79. Id.
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and contrasted the Wyoming law with the Alaska Hire statute stricken
in Hicklin. 80
The court described several features that narrow the scope of the
Wyoming Preference Act. First, the Act does not attempt to eliminate
general unemployment. Instead, it applies only to nonresident appli-
cants for public works construction jobs.8 Second, the statute limits
demands on employers, merely requiring an employer to deny nonresi-
dents employment when the state can provide qualified residents to
meet its needs.82 Finally, the statute applies only to projects in which
the state has a proprietary interest.8 3 The court concluded that the
Act was constitutional because it narrowly addressed the goal of re-
ducing unemployment and because the degree of discrimination "bears
a close relation to the state's valid reasons for discriminatory
treatment.184
Gaps exist in the Antonich court's reasoning. The Toomer-
Hicklin test requires (1) that nonresidents constitute a peculiar source
of the evil at which the statute is aimed, and (2) that the discrimina-
tion be no greater than necessary. The Antonich court's opinion, how-
ever, lacks analysis of either of these issues.
Nonresidents may in fact cause unemployment in Wyoming. In
1985, the state ranked fourth highest in percentage of unemployment
benefits paid interstate.85 This factor may indicate a high percentage
of nonresidents working in Wyoming.86 The combination of these fac-
tors indicates that Wyoming has an unemployment problem that may
be caused by nonresidents. The court should have considered such
factors in its opinion rather than assuming that a causal relationship
existed between nonresident laborers and unemployment.8 7
80. Id. at 64. The court stated:
The Wyoming statute at issue in the present case requires merely that gov-
ernmental funds, allocated to public works projects, be used to hire qualified,
available residents in preference to nonresidents. The statute does not effect
the sort of wide-ranging discriminatory treatment fatal to Alaska Hire in
Hicklin v. Orbeck
Id. at 63.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 64.
85. LABOR REPORT, supra note 3, at 19.
86. See supra note 5.
87. State v. Antonich, 694 P.2d 60, 64 (Wyo. 1985) (Thomas, C.J., concurring).
Chief Justice Thomas stated:
I have a concern about the adequacy of the record to support the nexus
between the evil of "a qualified Wyoming worker's remaining unemployed
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The concurrence in Antonich points out a second flaw in the ma-
jority's analysis. Although the majority finds that the statute's nar-
rowing features allowed it to pass the second prong of the Toomer-
Hicklin test, the concurrence disagreed with this holding.8  The con-
currence notes that the preference granted by the statute is not limited
to those who are unemployed. Any Wyoming resident who is quali-
fied and available for work receives a preference.89 A statute granting
employed residents a preference to the detriment of nonresidents is
overbroad for its stated purposes of reducing unemployment.
In sum, Antonich demonstrates that a local hire statute can pass
judicial scrutiny. However, the court apparently applied the Toomer-
Hicklin test perfunctorily. Although it is possible that the Wyoming
statute could have passed constitutional muster, the Antonich opinion
does not prove that the statute should have survived.
B. Cases Striking Local Hire Laws
State and federal courts outside Alaska have held local hire laws
unconstitutional as violative of the privileges and immunities clause.
Perhaps the most restrictive interpretation of the constitutionality of a
local hire law derives from a 1984 advisory opinion of the Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachusetts to the Massachusetts Senate. 90 The
Massachusetts court analyzed a proposed bill that would require pri-
vate contractors on state-funded projects in areas with high unemploy-
ment to employ Massachusetts residents in at least eighty percent of
all jobs covered by the contract.91
In its analysis of the bill, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massa-
chusetts observed initially that the bill would burden a fundamental
right.92 The court then found that the bill failed both prongs of the
Toomer-Hicklin test. Noting that it had no records with which to
work, the court assumed arguendo that nonresidents were a peculiar
while a nonresident goes to work on a government-funded construction pro-
ject" and the statute in question. I agree that that is a possibility, but the
record does not demonstrate it.
Id.
88. Id.
89. Id. Unfortunately, the concurring opinion provides merely an unworkable
alternative. The concurrence relies upon the state's proprietary interest in the projects
to find that the statute does not violate the privileges and immunities clause. The
concurrence seems to stipulate that because the state is participating in the market-
place its actions are immune from privileges and immunities clause scrutiny. Id. at 65.
The United States Supreme Court, however, has rejected that argument. See supra
note 24.
90. Opinion of the Justices to the Senate, 393 Mass. 1201, 469 N.E.2d 821 (1984).
91. Id. at 1201-02, 469 N.E.2d at 822.
92. Id. at 1203, 469 N.E.2d at 823.
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source of unemployment in Massachusetts. The court added, how-
ever, that such a finding "may be merely conclusory. ' 93 The bill also
failed the second prong of the Toomer-Hicklin test because the court
found that the degree of discrimination did not bear a close relation-
ship to the goal sought to be achieved by the bill.94 The bill provided
no proof that an eighty percent preference was related empirically to
the evil of nonresident interference. 95 Any employed or unemployed
Massachusetts resident with any level of training or experience re-
ceived a preference. 96 The bill also did not limit the preference to resi-
dents of critical areas.97 Thus, even if nonresidents were found to be a
peculiar source of unemployment in Massachusetts, in the opinion of
the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, the bill would not pass
constitutional muster.98
W.C.M. Window Co. v. Bernard,99 a case analyzing an Illinois
preference statute, provides an enlightening examination of the consti-
tutional issues involved in the local hire debate. The statute was a
typical one, providing a complete preference to Illinois residents as
laborers on public works projects.100 The United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Seventh Circuit, in an opinion by Judge Posner, held that
although unemployment may be a valid ground for discrimination,101
the state must show some nexus between the statute and the problem it
93. Id. at 1205 n.5, 469 N.E.2d at 824 n.5. The court noted:
It is possible that the unemployment rate in an area may vastly exceed the
percentage of positions held by nonresidents, and that the types of positions
held by nonresidents may be different in nature from those for which Massa-
chusetts residents are both available and appropriately trained. It is also
possible that employment of nonresidents might be the result of such factors
as too few trained applicants in the local labor force rather than the cause of
unemployment in the local area, so that the level of local unemployment
may not be directly related to the employment of nonresidents. In short, a
conclusory finding might not show that nonresidents are a "peculiar source
of the evil."
Id.
94. Id. at 1206, 469 N.E.2d at 824.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. The court also held that Massachusetts' proprietary interest in the projects
was insufficient to justify its discrimination. Id. at 1207, 469 N.E.2d at 825-26. The
court noted that in projects funded only partially by Massachusetts, the state's propri-
etary interest would be less. Id.
99. 730 F.2d 486 (7th Cir. 1984). One month after the W CM. Window Co. deci-
sion, the Illinois Supreme Court struck down the state's local hire statute on privileges
and immunities grounds in People v. Leary Construction Co., 102 Ill. 2d 295, 464
N.E.2d 1019 (1984).
100. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 48, paras. 269-275 (1986).
101. W.C.M. Window Co., 730 F.2d at 497. "[T]he intimation in Hicklin ... that
unemployment may never be a valid ground for discriminating against nonresidents
can no longer be considered authoritative. The Court in United Bldg. & Construction
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seeks to remedy.102 Illinois had presented no evidence of the benefits
of the preference law, a fatal flaw in the view of Judge Posner. He
wrote:
The preference law might have no effect on the unemployment rate
in Illinois. Worse, it could boomerang, and actually increase unem-
ployment in the construction industry. Suppose for example that a
public construction project would cost $1 million if it employed
both Illinois residents and nonresidents and $1.2 million if it em-
ployed only Illinois residents. If the higher price were more than
[the government] was willing to pay, the project would not be au-
thorized and the Illinois residents who would have worked on it
would have to seek work elsewhere. 103
Thus, Judge Posner's analysis reveals the possible ramifications of
discrimination against nonresidents through employment preferences.
The court concluded that the state fell short in its attempt to prove
that nonresidents were a peculiar source of unemployment, and the
statute, therefore, was an unconstitutional infringement on the rights
of nonresidents. 104
Three other often-cited cases also hold local hire laws unconstitu-
tional. These cases are Neshaminy Constructors v. Krause, 10 5 Salla v.
County of Monroe, 1O6 and Laborers Local Union No. 374 v. Felton Con-
struction Co.. 10 7 Although these state cases predate Camden, they
nonetheless provide useful insights. 08 Initially, the Salla and Felton
courts ruled that employment is a fundamental right, thus triggering
privileges and immunities analysis. 0 9 The Felton court found that the
state had nbt proven that nonresidents constituted a peculiar source of
unemployment."10 The court reasoned that without evidence that an
[Trades Council v. Mayor of Camden] not only allowed the City of Camden to at-
tempt to justify the discrimination but quoted from Toomer the statement that 'the
states should have considerable leeway in analyzing local evils and in prescribing ap-
propriate cures.'" Id. (citations omitted).
102. WC.M. Window Co., 730 F.2d at 497.
103. Id. at 498.
104. Id.
105. 181 N.J. Super. 376, 437 A.2d 733 (1981).
106. 48 N.Y.2d 514, 399 N.E.2d 909, 423 N.Y.S.2d 878 (1979).
107. 98 Wash. 2d 121, 654 P.2d 67 (1982).
108. In the interest of brevity, the local hire statutes involved are not presented
here. Each, however, is typical of local hire laws explored thus far, providing a sweep-
ing employment preference for all state residents on public construction projects for
all or a large percentage of all jobs.
109. Felton, 98 Wash. 2d at 126, 654 P.2d at 70; Salla, 48 N.Y.2d at 522-23, 399
N.E.2d at 913, 423 N.Y.S.2d at 882. The Krause court seems to overlook this require-
ment. Krause, 181 N.J. Super. 376, 437 A.2d 733.
110. Felton, 98 Wash. 2d at 129, 654 P.2d at 70. The court noted that the state had
not:
provide[d] any evidence regarding the extent to which wages would be di-
verted out of state.... [S]ome secondary economic activity is generated
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"evil" existed, it could not analyze whether the statute was closely
related to eliminating that evil.111 Finally, the court considered the
state's proprietary interest and held that the interest was too insub-
stantial to save the statute.112
The Salla 113 court followed similar reasoning. Again, the state
had not proven that nonresidents constituted a peculiar source of un-
employment, 114 nor was the statute closely tailored to achieve the
state's goal of reducing unemployment. 1 5 The law, "with blunder-
buss overbreadth," 116 granted a blanket employment preference to res-
idents without distinguishing among various levels of competence."17
The court also believed the law to be inefficient because employers lost
control over hiring decisions.118 Once again, the state's asserted pro-
prietary interest was inadequate to rectify the discrimination caused
by the statute."19
In Krause, 120 the Superior Court of New Jersey found that state's
statute was marred by the "same infirmities" stricken by the New
York court in Salla. '2 The court concluded that a state law that al-
lowed the hiring of nonresidents for work on state construction only
when residents were unavailable violated the privileges and immuni-
ties clause under the Toomer-Hicklin analysis.122 Additionally, the
Krause court found the state's proprietary interest in the project at bar
too attenuated to justify the state's discrimination.12 3
only by having out-of-state workers with their additional requirements of
food and shelter. Finally, even if we were to assume some wages would be
diverted out of state, we have been provided no information by which to
compare ... that "loss" . . . with the advantage of lower bids on public
works by out-of-state contractors.
Id. at 128, 654 P.2d at 70.
111. Id. at 129, 654 P.2d at 71.
112. Id. at 129-32, 654 P.2d at 71-72. The federal government had financed 75%
of the project from which the case arose. Id. at 130, 654 P.2d at 71.
113. 48 N.Y.2d 514, 399 N.E.2d 909, 423 N.Y.S.2d 878 (1979).
114. Id. at 523, 399 N.E.2d at 914, 423 N.Y.S.2d at 882.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 523-24, 399 N.E.2d at 914, 423 N.Y.S.2d at 882-83.
118. Id. at 524, 399 N.E.2d at 914, 423 N.Y.S.2d at 883.
119. Id. at 525, 399 N.E.2d at 914, 423 N.Y.S. 2d at 883. The project was financed
largely by the federal government.
120. 181 N.J. Super. 376, 437 A.2d 733 (1981).
121. Id. at 382-83, 437 A.2d at 737 (citation omitted).
122. Id. at 381, 437 A.2d at 736.
123. Id. at 383, 437 A.2d at 737. The project leading to the Krause case was 80%
federally funded. Id.
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IV. ALASKA
A. Robison v. Francis
In its most recent local hire law case, Robison v. Francis, 124 the
Alaska Supreme Court struck down a law that required work on
public construction projects to be performed almost entirely by Alaska
residents. 125 The case arose from the firing of a Montana resident,
James Francis, from an Alaska public works construction project. 126
Francis worked in 1983 as an ironworker for Regan Steel & Supply, a
subcontractor on a high school project.127 After the Alaska Depart-
ment of Labor learned that Regan Steel Supply had employed more
than five percent nonresidents, it notified the company of the violation
of the statute, thereby causing Francis to be discharged. 2 8 Francis
sued the state and several state officials, attempting to obtain a decla-
ration that the local hire law was unconstitutional under the privileges
and immunities clause of article IV, the equal protection and privileges
and immunities clauses of the fourteenth amendment to the federal
Constitution, and the equal protection clause of the Alaska Constitu-
tion.' 29 After a bench trial, the Superior Court in the Third Judicial
District declared the statute to be violative of the United States Con-
stitution's article IV privileges and immunities clause.' 30
The superior court applied the Toomer-Hicklin test, and held that
the right to obtain employment was fundamental and that the state
124. 713 P.2d 259 (Alaska 1986).
125. ALASKA STAT. § 36.10.010 (repealed 1986) provided in part:
(a) In the performance of contracts let by a municipality for construc-
tion, repair, preliminary surveys, engineering studies, consulting, mainte-
nance work or any other retention of services necessary to complete any
given project, 95 percent residents shall be employed where they are avail-
able and qualified. If 10 or fewer persons are employed under the contract,
then 90 percent residents shall be employed where they are available and
qualified. In all cases of public works projects, preferences shall be given to
residents....
(b) When a construction project is partly or wholly funded by state
money and the state or an agency of the state, a department, office, agency,
state board, commission, regional school board . . . is a signatory to the
construction contract, the contract shall require that the worker hours on a
craft-by-craft basis shall be performed at least 95 percent by bona fide state
residents. If 10 or fewer persons are employed under the contract, then 90
percent residents shall be employed where they are available and qualified.
Id.
126. Francis, 713 P.2d at 261.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id. Francis also sought injunctive relief and damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(1982). Francis, 713 P.2d at 261.
130. Francis, 713 P.2d at 261
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had failed to justify the burden it had placed on this right.131 The
court found insufficient the evidence that nonresidents were a peculiar
source of unemployment in Alaska's construction industry. 132 In this
regard, the court noted Alaska's population and economic growth,
and concluded that the major factor affecting construction employ-
ment in Alaska was the state's extreme weather conditions. 133
Although immigration is a factor affecting unemployment, the court
conceded, most job-seekers coming to Alaska intend to reside there. 134
Therefore, the state failed to meet either prong of the Toomer-Hicklin
test because it proved neither that nonresidents were a peculiar source
of unemployment in Alaska nor that the resident preference act was a
narrowly tailored means to address the problem. 135
The Alaska Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's holding.13 6
As a preliminary matter, the court concluded that Francis' claim fell
within the scope of the privileges and immunities clause, stating that
employment within the construction industry is a fundamental
right. 137 The court then rigorously applied the Toomer-Hicklin test to
the facts of the case. To satisfy the first prong of the Toomer-Hicklin
test, the state must show substantial justification for the discrimina-
tion. In Francis, the State of Alaska contended that the local hire law
decreased state unemployment rates by eliminating nonresidents from
public works construction projects. The court, applying intermediate
scrutiny, found this justification insubstantial. 3 8 The court admitted
that Alaska did in fact suffer from high unemployment. However, the
state did not show at trial that nonresidents were a peculiar source of
unemployment in Alaska. 1 39 Additionally, the state's purported justi-
fication was insufficient as a matter of law. According to the court,
131. Id. at 262.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 261.
136. Id. at 271.
137. Id. at 265.
138. Id. at 266. The court applied intermediate scrutiny even though the statute
was limited to situations in which the state was acting as a market participant. This
level of scrutiny is contrary to the Supreme Court's holding in United Building &
Construction Trades Council v. Mayor of Camden that a court should grant a state
more leeway when the state is setting conditions on funds in its control. 465 U.S. 208,
223 (1984). See supra note 68. The Francis court held that the leeway allowed by
Camden was negated in this case by the "pervasiveness and intensity" of the discrimi-
nation wrought by the statute. Francis, 713 P.2d at 265. Public works projects consti-
tute 60% to 70% of all construction within the state, and because of the act,
nonresidents were almost completely excluded from the projects. Id.
139. Francis, 713 P.2d at 266.
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benefitting residents economically at the expense of nonresidents is an
improper and unconstitutional purpose.140
The resident preference also failed the second prong of the
Toomer-Hicklin test, which requires that the statute be sufficiently
narrow in scope. The statute at issue, like that stricken in Hicklin,
gave "preferential treatment to residents who d[id] not need it and
therefore was overly broad." 141 For instance, a resident need not have
been unemployed to obtain a preference under the statute. Any avail-
able and qualified Alaskan could receive a preference even if he were
already employed in the private sector and wanted merely to switch to
a public sector job. 142 Moreover, although an employer could apply
for a waiver of the statute, an individual worker had no remedy.143
The statute also did not reflect the disparity of unemployment rates in
different areas of Alaska, thus providing employment preferences in
areas where jobs were plentiful. 144 Finally, the statute superseded any
collective bargaining agreements, which generally called for a fifty to
sixty percent resident preference.' 45 In summary, the statute was in-
sufficiently narrow in scope, thus failing the second prong of the
Toomer-Hicklin test and, as previously stated, the statute failed the
first prong of the test because the state had failed to show a substantial
reason for its discrimination. 146
140. Id. The court quoted a footnote in New Hampshire v. Piper, 470 U.S. 274,
285 n.18 (1985). A reason suggested for New Hampshire's law prohibiting nonresi-
dent lawyers from joining the bar was the protection of New Hampshire lawyers. The
Court stated: "This reason is not 'substantial.' The privileges and immunities clause
was designed primarily to prevent such economic protectionism." Id.
141. Francis, 713 P.2d at 268.
142. Brief for Appellee at 34, Robison v. Francis, 713 P.2d 259 (Alaska 1986) (No.
S-493).
143. Id. at 35.
144. Id. at 37.
145. Id. The Francis challengers argued that because unions would be the strong-
est supporters of a resident preference act, any legislation exceeding union demands is
excessively broad. Id. at 38.
146. As a tangential matter, the court noted important distinctions between the
facts of United Building & Construction Trades Council v. Mayor of Camden, 465
U.S. 208 (1984), and Francis. The Francis court contrasted Alaska's "dynamic and
growing economy" with the depressed economy of Camden. 713 P.2d at 269. The
court stated:
The fact that the [Camden] program was not rejected in the face of grave
economic and social ills may mean that local or state governments may fos-
ter discrimination in order to stave off an economic or social collapse, a goal
broader than, but related to, that of benefitting local residents economically.
Id. at 267 n.8.
The Alaska statute also effected greater discrimination than Camden's ordinance.
Id. at 269. The court noted that public works projects constitute the majority of com-
mercial construction in Alaska. Conceding that the Camden opinion does not contain
similar data, the Francis court then compared the 90% preference of Alaska's law to
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Perhaps the most interesting facet of Francis is Justice Burke's
concurrence. Justice Burke agreed that the statute violated the privi-
leges and immunities clause, 147 but contended that the statute should
have been invalidated under the Alaska Constitution's equal protec-
tion clause. 148 In his opinion, however, Justice Burke presented no
substantive analysis under the equal protection clause. He simply
noted that, as a procedural matter, a state court considering challenges
under federal and state constitutions should first consider state re-
quirements.1 49 Justice Burke also noted that a holding under the
Alaska Constitution would not be reviewed by the United States
Supreme Court and thus would be final. 150
B. The New Local Hire Law
After the Alaska Supreme Court decided Francis, the Alaska
Legislature created employment preferences for certain residents of
statutorily defined "zones of underemployment" and "economically
distressed zones." 15' The preferences, still untested in the courts, pro-
vide as follows:
See. 36.10.150. Determination of zone of underemployment.
(a) Immediately following a determination by the com-
missioner of labor that a zone of underemployment exists, and
for the next two fiscal years after the determination, qualified
residents of the zone who are eligible under AS [Alaska Stat-
utes] 36.10.140 shall be given preference in hiring for work on
Camden's 40% preference. Id. The focus of the Camden case also was different. The
main issue in Camden was whether the privileges and immunities clause applied to a
municipal law that discriminated against both in-state and out-of-state residents. Be-
cause the Camden court never decided whether the city's law violated the privileges
and immunities clause, the case "did not shed much new light" for the Francis court.
Id. The Francis court also quickly rejected State v. Antonich, 694 P.2d 60 (Wyo.
1985), as persuasive because Antonich relied heavily on Camden. Francis, 713 P.2d at
269.
147. The majority noted that its decision, based on the privileges and immunities
clause, precluded analysis under the federal constitution's fourteenth amendment or
the Alaska Constitution. Francis, 713 P.2d at 271.
148. Article I, section 1 of the Alaska Constitution provides in part: "[a]ll persons
are equal and entitled to equal rights, opportunities and protection under the law."
149. Francis, 713 P.2d at 271 (Burke, J., concurring) (citation omitted). The state
equal protection analysis suggested by Justice Burke is discussed infra in section
(IV)(B)(2) of this note.
150. Francis, 713 P.2d at 272 (Burke, J., concurring). See Minnesota v. Clover
Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 461 n.2 (1981). For a discussion of the doctrine of
independent and adequate state grounds, see Wise, Northern Lights - Equal Protec-
tion Analysis in Alaska, 3 ALASKA L. REv. 1 (1986).
151. ALASKA STAT. §§ 36.10.070-.990 (1987). The amendments include employ-
ment preferences for economically disadvantaged minority and female residents. Id.
§§ 36.10.170, .175. Analysis of these provisions, however, is beyond the scope of this
note.
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each project under AS [Alaska Statutes] 36.10.180 that is
wholly or partially sited within the zone. The preference ap-
plies on a craft-by-craft or occupational basis.
(b) The commissioner of labor shall determine the
amount of work that must be performed under this section by
qualified residents who are eligible for an employment prefer-
ence . . . In making this determination, the commissioner
shall consider the nature of the work, the classification of
workers, availability of eligible residents, and the willingness of
eligible residents to perform the work.
(c) The commissioner shall determine that a zone of un-
deremployment exists if the commissioner finds that
(1) the rate of unemployment within the zone is
substantially higher than the national rate of
unemployment;
(2) a substantial number of residents in the zone
have experience or training in occupations
that would be employed on a public works
project;
(3) the lack of employment opportunities in the
zone has substantially contributed to serious
social or economic problems in the zone; and
(4) employment of workers who are not residents
is a peculiar source of unemployment of resi-
dents of the zone.1 52
Sec. 36.10.160. Preference for residents of economically distressed
zones.
(a) Immediately following a determination by the commis-
sioner that an economically distressed zone exists, and for the
next two fiscal years after the determination, qualified residents
of the zone who are eligible under AS [Alaska Statutes]
36.10.140 shall be given preference in hiring for at least 50 per-
cent of employment on each project under AS [Alaska Stat-
utes] 36.10.180 that is wholly or partially sited within the zone.
The preference applies on a craft-by-craft or occupational
basis.
(b) The commissioner shall determine that an economically
distressed zone exists if the commissioner finds that
(1) the per capita income of residents of the zone is
less than 90 percent of the per capita income of the
United States as a whole, or the unemployment
rate in the zone exceeds the national rate of unem-
ployment by at least five percentage points;
(2) the lack of employment opportunities in the zone
has substantially contributed to serious social or
economic problems in the zone; and
152. ALASKA STAT. § 36.10.150 (1987).
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(3) employment of workers who are not residents is a
peculiar source of unemployment of residents of
the zone. 153
These statutes are similar in that both preferences only apply to
eligible residents within the zones. Under Alaska Statutes section
36.10.140, a zone resident is eligible for an employment preference if
he is unemployed, underemployed, or the graduate of a job-training
program. 154 Also, both statutes only apply to projects specified in sec-
tion 36.10.180, generally those projects funded in whole or in part by
Alaska.155 Neither statute is triggered unless nonresidents are found
to be a peculiar source of unemployment within the zone.1
56
The statutes are substantially different in that section 36.10.150
gives the commissioner of labor considerable leeway to cope with the
specific problems of underemployment, while section 36.10.160
presents far more specific triggers and remedies in economically dis-
tressed zones. For example, the commissioner must determine the
amount of hiring preference necessary in a zone of underemployment,
which exists when the rate of unemployment within the zone is "sub-
stantially higher" than the national rate.1 57 By contrast, in an eco-
nomically distressed zone, residents are granted a fifty percent
employment preference when, among other factors, zone residents' per
capita income is less than ninety percent of the national average or
unemployment within the zone exceeds the national rate by at least
five percent. 158
Each statute is specifically tailored to achieve its goal. While a
statute granting wide leeway to fashion remedies in zones of underem-
ployment allows the most specific solution possible for each zone, a
153. Id. § 36.10.160.
154. ALASKA STAT. § 36.10.140 provides:
Sec. 36.10.140. Eligibility for preference. (a) A person is eligible for
an employment preference under this chapter if the person certifies eligibility
as required by the Department of Labor, is a resident, and
(1) is receiving unemployment benefits under AS [Alaska Stat.]
23.20 or would be eligible to receive benefits but has exhausted
them;
(2) is not working and has registered to find work with a public or
private employment agency or a local hiring hall;
(3) is underemployed or marginally employed as defined by the de-
partment; or
(4) has completed a job-training program approved by the depart-
ment and is either not employed or is engaged in employment
that does not use the skills acquired in the job-training program.
155. See id. § 36.10.180.
156. Id. §§ 36.10.150(c)(4), .160(b)(3).
157. Id. § 36.10.150(c)(1).
158. Id. § 36.10.160(b)(1).
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statute mandating when a preference is needed and enacting the mini-
mum preference necessary allows for less chance of arbitrary or dis-
criminatory enforcement.
If history repeats itself, Alaska's new employment preferences
will face a court challenge in the future. Although one might attempt
to base a challenge on several constitutional theories, only two viable
grounds exist: the article IV privileges and immunities clause of the
Constitution of the United States and the equal protection clause of
the Alaska constitution. 159
1. Privileges and Immunities Analysis. The Francis majority ar-
ticulated the framework to be used for privileges and immunities
clause analysis: the Toomer-Hicklin test.' 60 The new Alaska statutes
regulate employment, a fundamental right protected by the privileges
and immunities clause. 16' Because the statutes discriminate against
nonresidents of the zones in which they are enforced, Alaska must
show substantial justification for the statutes' enactment.' 62 As the
Francis court reasoned, the state must prove two points to show sub-
stantial justification. First, the state must show that nonresidents are a
peculiar source of unemployment; 163 second, the state must offer a
constitutionally acceptable purpose for the statute.' 64
Because the statutes apply only when nonresidents constitute a
peculiar source of unemployment, 65 it would seem that the statutes
facially could meet the first requirement.' 66 A statute, however, may
also be unconstitutional as applied.' 67 If the commissioner of labor
enforces the statutes when nonresidents do not in fact constitute a pe-
culiar source of unemployment in an area, that application would be
unconstitutional.
Even if the state could show that nonresidents constituted a pecu-
liar source of unemployment, the state would find it difficult to prove
that its justification for the statute is legally permissible. In Francis,
the court used a sliding scale analysis to determine the level of scrutiny
159. See supra notes 23-24 for a discussion of the United States Supreme Court's
preclusion of other federal constitutional routes.
160. See supra notes 138-46.
161. See supra note 137. The statutes do not fall outside the scope of the privileges
and immunities clause merely because they discriminate against Alaska residents as
well as nonresidents. This conclusion may be drawn from a Supreme Court holding in
United Building & Construction Trades Council v. Mayor of Camden, 465 U.S. 208
(1984), discussed supra note 60.
162. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
163. See supra note 139 and accompanying text.
164. See supra note 140 and accompanying text.
165. See supra note 156 and accompanying text.
166. Of course, a court must still make this factual finding.
167. R. ROTUNDA, J. NOWAK, & J. YOUNG, supra note 23, § 18.4, at 344.
[Vol. 4:359
LOCAL HIRE LAWS
to be used when analyzing a state's purported justification for nonresi-
dent discrimination. 168 While a court may scrutinize a law less strictly
when a state is acting as a market participant,1 69 the pervasiveness of
the discrimination may negate the state's economic interest.
170
Although the 1986 statutes apply to the same jobs as the law invali-
dated in Francis, 171 the discrimination wrought by the new statutes is
less pervasive than that caused by Alaska's previous local hire statutes.
Concededly, the construction industry is an important part of Alaska's
economy, and public works projects constitute up to seventy percent
of all construction jobs in Alaska.172 However, the old statute applied
statewide 73 and to all residents. The new laws operate only when an
area has been declared a zone of underemployment or an economically
distressed zone. 174 Additionally, not all residents of such zones are
entitled to such a preference. 175 The preferences themselves also are
more limited: in both types of zones the preference applies on "a
craft-by-craft or occupational basis." 176
The state has the same proprietary interest in the projects encom-
passed within both the old and the new statutes. 177 The Francis court
stated that it did not give weight to the state's proprietary interest
because of the wide discrimination caused by the law at issue.178 The
court therefore applied intermediate scrutiny. With respect to the new
laws, the less pervasive discrimination involved might persuade a
court to apply a lesser level of scrutiny should the statutes be chal-
lenged under the privileges and immunities clause. Even if intermedi-
ate scrutiny were applied, however, the law might pass muster.
To survive intermediate scrutiny, the state must have a substan-
tial justification for its discrimination. In Francis, the majority struck
down the state's justification, reducing unemployment caused by non-
residents, as the sort of economic protectionism that the privileges and
immunities clause was designed to prevent. 179 The rationale behind
168. Robison v. Francis, 713 P.2d 259, 264 (1986).
169. Id. at 265.
170. Id.
171. See supra notes 125, 155 and accompanying text.
172. Francis, 713 P.2d at 262.
173. ALASKA STAT. § 36.10.010 (repealed 1986).
174. Id. §§ 36.10.150, .160 (1987).
175. See supra note 154 and accompanying text.
176. ALASKA STAT. §§ 36.10.150(a), .160(a) (1987).
177. The employment preferences in both Francis and the new statutes apply when
a project is funded "in whole or in part" by Alaska. ALASKA STAT. §§ 36.10.010
(1982), 36.10.180 (1987).
178. See supra note 138 and accompanying text.
179. See supra note 140 and accompanying text.
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the new statutes is identical. 180 The Camden court implied that a state
may foster such policies in certain situations,18' but the Francis court
believed that exception inapplicable, contrasting Camden's bleak econ-
omy with Alaska's dynamic one.' 82 The court was correct in its as-
sessment. The new amendments, however, directly address the
situation the United States Supreme Court recognized in Camden: al-
lowing economic protectionism in the face of disastrous economic con-
ditions within a state. Alaska no longer has a booming economy. 83
The legislature recognized that, in some areas especially, unemploy-
ment is a critical problem. At least as to the first prong of the Toomer-
Hicklin test, the statute may fit within the loophole left open in Cam-
den by the Supreme Court.
The Toomer-Hicklin test, however, also requires that the statutes
be narrowly tailored.' 84 These statutes fail to meet this requirement.
As previously noted, the statutes apply only in limited circumstances
to certain individuals. 185 However, the statutes permit a complete
preference to residents. The preference in economically distressed
zones is a minimum of fifty percent of employment. The statute, how-
ever, sets no maximum level.186 Furthermore, in zones of underem-
ployment, the labor commissioner has complete discretion as to the
amount of preference.18 7
In sum, the statutes will not survive privileges and immunities
scrutiny. Although the state may be able to prove that nonresidents
constitute a peculiar source of unemployment, it is doubtful that the
state could show a substantial justification for its discrimination in
light of the Francis court's condemnation of economic protection-
ism.18 8 The Supreme Court may have left open a loophole in Camden,
but because the Court did not decide the case on the merits, this case is
of little value.189 Finally, even if the state could show a substantial
legal justification for the statutes, the allowance of so wide a range of
180. The Alaska Senate Bill preceding the new statutes provided: "This act is in-
tended to better fulfill the state's duty of loyalty to its citizens, reduce unemployment
among residents of the state, remedy social harm resulting from chronic unemploy-
ment, and assist economically and socially disadvantaged residents." S. 367, 14th
Leg., 2d Sess., 1986 Alaska Sess., Laws ch. 33, at 72.
181. United Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. Mayor of Camden, 465 U.S. 208,
222 (1984).
182. Robison v. Francis, 713 P.2d 259, 269 (Alaska 1986).
183. See supra notes 10-11.
184. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
185. See supra notes 154-56 and accompanying text.
186. ALASKA STAT. § 36.10.160 (1987).
187. Id. § 36.10.150.
188. See supra note 140 and accompanying text.
189. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
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preferences prevents the statutes from being sufficiently narrowly
tailored.
2. Alaska's Equal Protection. At the close of his concurring opin-
ion in Francis, Justice Burke warned that even if a statute does survive
scrutiny under the privileges and immunities clause, the law will not
necessarily pass muster under the Alaska Constitution. 190 Indeed,
Alaska's current equal protection analysis, which is distinct from fed-
eral equal protection analysis, 191 is a flexible tool available to the
court.
1 92
The Alaska Supreme Court has expressed dissatisfaction with the
rigidity of the two-tiered federal equal protection test.193 Conse-
quently, the court has developed a sliding scale review of equal protec-
tion claims arising under the Alaska Constitution.1 94 In Alaska Pacific
Assurance Company v. Brown, 195 the court set out a three-part frame-
work for equal protection analysis under the court's sliding scale.
First, a court must determine the amount of weight that should be
given to the constitutional interest impaired by the challenged law.196
The more important the interest, the greater the state's burden in justi-
fying the law. Second, a court must ascertain the purposes served by a
challenged law. Based on the level of review found appropriate, a state
may be required to show "only that its objectives were legitimate, at
the low end of the continuum, or, at the high end of the scale, that the
legislation was motivated by a compelling state interest." 197 Third, a
court must examine the fit between the means chosen by the state and
the purposes of the law. The more important the weight given to the
190. See supra text accompanying notes 147-50.
191. See supra note 24.
192. For a discussion of the development of Alaska's independent equal protection
analysis, see Wise, supra note 150. Although the United States Supreme Court's equal
protection analysis does not afford a viable constitutional platform for a local hire law
challenger, see supra note 24, Alaska's equal protection may. The Alaska Supreme
Court is free to establish a higher level of equal protection than that established by the
United States Supreme Court. See Wise, supra note 150, at 35. Indeed, through its
sliding scale review, the Alaska Supreme Court may provide a more stringent review
for those interests not considered important enough to warrant strict scrutiny under
the federal system. See infra notes 204-06 and accompanying text.
193. State v. Erickson, 574 P.2d 1, 11 (Alaska 1978).
194. Alaska Pacific Assurance Co. v. Brown, 687 P.2d 264, 269 (Alaska 1984) (cit-
ing State v. Erickson, 574 P.2d 1, 11 (Alaska 1978)).
195. 687 P.2d 264 (Alaska 1984). The Brown court summarized standards
announced in State v. Erickson, 574 P.2d 1 (Alaska 1978) and revised in State v.
Ostrosky, 667 P.2d 1184 (Alaska 1983).
196. Brown, 687 P.2d at 269.
197. Id.
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interest in step one, the closer the fit the court will require. 98 Thus,
the most important factor is the first step of the test, the importance of
the interest infringed upon. This factor determines the state's burden
in justifying the law in the second and third steps. 199
A challenger to a local hire law could frame his equal protection
argument as follows: it is irrational for the state to distinguish be-
tween residents and nonresidents who are similarly situated regarding
their right to employment. 2° A court would begin its analysis of this
claim by determining the importance of the claimant's right to em-
ployment on public works projects. Importantly, before the Alaska
Supreme Court originally adopted its sliding scale approach, the court
had stated in Hicklin v. Orbeck that the right to work was not funda-
mental for equal protection purposes.201 In the same case, moreover,
the court noted that nonresidents are not a suspect class.2 02 The lack
of either a suspect class or fundamental right suggests that the court
would not assign the highest level of importance on the sliding scale to
a local hire challenge. As previously stated, however, the Alaska
Supreme Court does not utilize - and indeed frequently criticizes -
the federal equal protection test's rigid two-tiered structure.20 3 That
test would immediately apply a rational basis test absent a suspect
class or a fundamental right. 2°4 Arguably, the right to employment is
one of substantial importance even if not considered fundamental. 20 5
Thus, the Alaska court could develop a middle ground to analyze the
importance of a nonresident's right to employment on public works
projects. One commentator suggests just such an application of the
Alaska sliding scale: "The real advantage of the Alaska sliding scale
approach will be in the middle range of interests between those inter-
ests to which the federal doctrine has applied only a rational basis
198. Id. "At the low end of the sliding scale, we have held that a substantial rela-
tionship between means and ends is constitutionally adequate. At the higher end of
the scale, the fit between means and ends must be much closer." Id. at 269-70.
199. Id. at 271.
200. Notably, one could not successfully assert that the local hire law impinges the
right to travel. The Alaska Supreme Court has consistently distinguished between
laws containing durational residency requirements, which may infringe one's right to
travel, and mere residency requirements, which do not. Brown, 687 P.2d at 271;
Gilman v. Martin, 662 P.2d 120, 125 (Alaska 1983).
201. 565 P.2d 159, 166 (Alaska 1977).
202. Id. at 167.
203. See supra note 193 and accompanying text,
204. See supra note 24.
205. See Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 322 (Marshall,
J., dissenting) (right to employment is "inalienable right; it was formulated as such
under the phrase 'pursuit of happiness' in the Declaration of Independence .... .
(citation omitted).
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review and those to which it has applied strict scrutiny. This is the
area where federal cases have been most inconsistent .... ,,206
Alaska's equal protection analysis still is developing. It is impos-
sible to predict what verbal formulation a court would utilize to apply
the second and third steps once the court assigned a level of impor-
tance to the right to employment. At the second step, one must ascer-
tain the purpose of the local hire laws. The stated purpose of the act is
to reduce unemployment among Alaska residents.20 7 The court has in
the past, however, substituted its own belief as to the purpose of a
law.20 8 One might characterize the act's purpose as protecting local
workers from outside competition, a purpose condemned under privi-
leges and immunities analysis in Francis. 209 If the latter were charac-
terized by the court as the state's true purpose, a local hire law might
not withstand scrutiny at the lowest point on the sliding scale, which
requires that the state's purpose be legitimate.210 Moreover, the fact
that Alaska has adopted this sliding scale indicates that the court may
apply more than the biteless rational basis test when an interest as
important as employment is affected. Therefore, the state may have to
show more than the legitimacy of a local hire law's purpose, though
how much more is unknown. Notably, the Alaska Supreme Court has
characterized reducing unemployment as an important - even com-
pelling - purpose.211 As a result, should the court characterize this
as the act's purpose, the state would then have a strong justification for
the statute.
Finally, in the last step of the sliding scale test, the court analyzes
the tightness of the means-end fit. The more important the interest
assigned in step one, the tighter the fit needs to be. As discussed under
privileges and immunities analysis, the statutes are not narrowly tai-
lored.212 Privileges and immunities analysis requires a reasonable rela-
tionship between means and end, a standard resembling the low end of
review under the sliding scale.213 Arguably, therefore, the statute
could not satisfy even the lowest test of the sliding scale.
The Alaska equal protection clause could prove a formidable ob-
stacle to the state's new local hire law. The court's sliding scale analy-
sis is a useful and flexible tool by which it may afford close scrutiny to
206. Wise, supra note 150, at 44 (footnote omitted).
207. See supra note 180 and accompanying text.
208. See, e.g., Isakson v. Rickey, 550 P.2d 339 (Alaska 1976).
209. See supra note 140 and accompanying text.
210. See supra note 197 and accompanying text.
211. State v. Wylie, 516 P.2d 142, 149 (Alaska 1973).
212. See supra notes 184-87 and accompanying text.
213. See Alaska Pacific Assurance Co. v. Brown, 687 P.2d 264, 269-70 (Alaska
1984).
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such an employment preference law. Because Alaska's equal protec-
tion doctrine still is developing, however, it is difficult to predict ex-
actly what level of scrutiny the Alaska Supreme Court will apply if
again faced with an equal protection challenge to a local hire law.
V. CONCLUSION
The legislature has again enacted a local hire law, and again
Alaska courts likely will strike down the law under either the article
IV privileges and immunities clause or Alaska's equal protection
clause. That result is the correct one: although a popular short-term
solution, economic protection is not a long-term answer to Alaska's
problems. As Mr. Justice Cardozo once observed, the Constitution
"was framed upon the theory that the peoples of the several states
must sink or swim together, and that in the long run prosperity and
salvation are in union and not division. '214
Sandra J Hardgrove
214. Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 523 (1935).
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